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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk.

We offer for consideration of our readers' this month several decisions
of more or less interest—more to those who have tax matters to handle
for estates, and less to those who have no such matters. Three of the
decisions' published this month refer to estate taxes and one refers to the
application to a particular case of section 209 of the revenue act of 1917. If
the reader has a client who has not been finally allocated for the levying
of 1917 excess-profits tax among those whose excess-profits tax should be
computed at the rate of 8 per cent. over the allowable credits and exemp
tions' or among those paying the tax at the graduated rates, he will read
with some interest treasury decision No. 3334.
(T. D. 3334—May 25, 1922)
Excess-profits tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
Invested Capital—Selling Agent—Taxability under Section 209.
Plaintiff corporation acted as sole agent for a mining company under
an arrangement contemplating that it should discount drafts in the case of
foreign shipments and pay the amount of the invoices in the case of
domestic shipments, retaining in both cases only commissions and interest,
so that the principal was constantly in the corporation’s debt for advances.
The corporation was incorporated for $25,000, and in 1917 had capital,
at the beginning of the year, of $51,074, and income of $26,890.34 from
commissions from selling for account of its principal, $22,133.25 profits
from buying and selling on its own account, and $5,851.90 from interest.
In 1915 the proportion of gross profits from trading on its own account
was 23 per cent.; in 1916, 9.8 per cent., and in 1917, 45 per cent. Its profits
during 1917 were retained, and not distributed as dividends, and its officers
made substantial advances to aid it in financing the business. The capital
of the corporation was not used merely to pay ordinary expenses, but to
assist in paying advances to its principal, as well as to trade on its own
account. During 1917 its capital was engaged in its business and was
being turned over in connection with sales, its advances including capital
available or capital repaid from advances. On December 31, 1917, when
its bank balance was larger than in any other month of the year, it was
only $16,501.67, while its capital and surplus amounted to $78,330. Held,
that such corporation did not merely buy and sell on commission but traded
substantially on its own account, and had a substantial invested capital
which was employed in making advances to or on account of its principal,
and also in buying merchandise on its own account for profitable sale, and
hence it was not entitled to assessment under section 209 of the revenue
act of 1917, which applies only to businesses having no invested capital or
not more than a nominal capital.
The appended decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York, rendered March 10, 1922, in the case of
R. H. Martin (Inc.) v. William H. Edwards, collector, is published for
the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
No. 751. United States District Court, Southern District of
New York.
R. H. Martin (Inc.), plaintiff, v. William H. Edwards, collector of internal
revenue, second district of New York, defendant.
[March 10, 1922.]
Augustus N. Hand, judge: The plaintiff brings this suit to recover the
sum of $8,348.50, the amount of an excess-profits tax alleged to have been
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erroneously assessed under the revenue act of 1917, and paid to the
defendant under protest.
The plaintiff corporation acted as sole agent for the Martin Bennett
Asbestos Mines, located at Thetford Mines, in the province of Quebec.
Under a written agreement, dated June 14, 1913, made between the Martin
Bennett Asbestos Mines and Robert H. Martin, it was provided that invoices
and bills of lading for each shipment of ore made by the Martin Bennett
Asbestos Mines to its customers were to be sent direct to R. H. Martin,
who had no responsibility to effect collection. In the case of export ship
ments Martin was to remit the amount of his sale less commission and
interest as soon as he had negotiated with his bankers the drafts against
such shipments. In the case of domestic shipments he was to make settle
ment by sending his check less commission and interest as soon as the
invoice could be properly checked up and accounted. The written memo
randum stated that Martin did not guarantee any of the accounts, and in
the event of their not being paid upon the date of maturity he was entitled
to charge the whole amount with interest back to the Martin Bennett
Asbestos Mines. The foregoing arrangement evidently contemplated that
Martin should discount the drafts in the case of foreign shipments and pay
the amount of the invoice in case of domestic shipments, retaining only his
commissions and interest. The plaintiff was organized for the purpose of
carrying on the agency business of Robert H. Martin and his son and
residuary legatee, Alexander R. Martin. It was incorporated with a capital
of $25,000, and assumed the agreement of Robert H. Martin, heretofore
mentioned, which he had made with the Martin Bennett Asbestos Mines.
It paid Alexander R. Martin, as president of the company, a salary of
$5,000, which was concededly less than the value of his services to the
company.
Plaintiff seeks to recover taxes alleged to have been overpaid upon the
theory that taxes should have been computed pursuant to section 209 of
the revenue act of 1917. This section provides:
That in the case of a trade or business having no invested capital or not
more than a nominal capital there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and
paid, in addition to the taxes under existing law and under this act, in lieu
of the tax imposed by section two hundred and one, a tax equivalent to
eight per centum of the net income of such trade or business in excess of
the following deductions: In the case of a domestic corporation $3,000;
and in the case of a domestic partnership or a citizen or resident of the
United States, $6,000; in the case of all other trades or business, no
deduction.
Article 73 of the regulations of the commissioner of internal revenue,
approved October 3, 1917, provides that—
Agents and brokers requiring and using no capital or merely a nominal
capital in their business are taxable under article 15 (same as section 209)
but commission houses regularly employing a substantial amount of capital,
whether to lend to principals or to carry goods on their own account, are
not deemed to be agents or brokers. . . .
Article 74 provides that—
. . . The term nominal capital as used in section 209 means in general
a small or negligible capital whose use in a particular trade or business is
incidental. The following will not construe as business having a nominal
capital for purposes of excess-profits tax:
(a) A business which because of conditions arising from the war or
exceptional opportunities for profits earns a disproportionately high rate of
profits during the taxable year, if it belongs to a class which necessarily
and customarily requires capital for its operations . . .
(b) Corporations which although their capitalization is nominal employ
a substantial amount of capital in their business.
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During the year 1915 the plaintiff purchased on its own account mer
chandise to the amount of $94,021.72 and sold such merchandise for
$98,626.31. In 1916 such purchases on its own account amounted to
$47,011.16 and sales on its account amounted to $49,225.66. In 1917 such
purchases on its own account amounted to $27,156.55 and sales amounted
to $49,289.89.
The plaintiff’s capital at the beginning of the year 1917 was $51,074. The
plaintiff was obliged under its arrangement to make settlements for domestic
shipments by sending its check, less commissions and interest, as soon as
the invoices could be properly checked up, and this it did.
During the year 1917 its income was derived from the following sources:
Commissions from selling for account of the mines. $26,890.34
Profits from buying and selling on its own account. 22,133.25
Interest.......................................................................
5,851.90

Total ..................................................................... $54,875.49
If it had limited itself to buying and selling on commission, with a
small incidental trading on its own account, the plaintiff’s contention would
be good, but in the case of this corporation it is evident that there was
substantial trading on its own account and also that it required capital to
conduct its business in the way it was conducted. In 1915 the proportion
of the gross profits received by the plaintiff for trading on his own account
was 23 per cent.; in 1916, 9.8 per cent.; and in 1917, 45 per cent. Its
profits during the year 1917 were retained, and not distributed as dividends,
and its officers continually made substantial advances besides to aid it in
financing the business it conducted. The capital was not used merely to
pay the ordinary expenses of the corporation, which were less than $3,000
a month, but to assist in making advances to its principal, for whom it
was acting as selling agent, as well as to trade on its own account.
I have indicated above that there was considerable trading by the
plaintiff on its own account in 1915-16, so that the large amount of such
trading in 1917 can not be regarded as merely “incidental.” (See art. 74
of regulations.) It is urged that during the year 1917, outside of the
months of January and February, when the remittances exceeded the
receipts by $6,088, plaintiff was able to conduct its business without resort
ing to its capital. This argument is based on the fact that except during
those two months it seems to have received more than it paid out. Its
capital was, however, during this very period engaged in its business and
being turned over in connection with sales of asbestos. Its advances
included capital available or capital repaid from advances. If this is not
so, I can not see where its capital was or what use was being made of it:
On December 31, 1917, when its bank balance was larger than in any
other month of the year, it was only $16,501.67, and yet the capital and
surplus then appears by the balance-sheet to have amounted to $78,330.
In its balance-sheet of December 31, 1916, out of its assets of $97,842.10,
$76,606.47 seems to have represented accounts and bills receivable derived
from sales for the account of the mines and sales on its own account,
$13,872.50 seems to have represented loans as direct advances to the
mines, before maturity of the bills of customers of the latter to whom
plaintiff had sold products of the mines. The balance-sheet of December
31, 1917, indicates the same sort of situation. Approximately only $16,000
of the capital and surplus, which aggregated $78,330, was available in the
form of cash in bank.
The situation somewhat resembles that in Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Anderson (241 Fed. 322.) There it was argued that the Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. of New York was not subject to a tax upon capital
and surplus employed in banking because there were sufficient investments
to exhaust its capital. The trust company unsuccessfully attempted to
attribute all its large and varied banking business to the use of assets
other than its capital, because there were sufficient permanent investments
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to exhaust the latter. Here it may be that there were sufficient bills and
accounts receivable derived from sale of products of the mines to offset
all loans and advances to the latter, but they had not been collected, and
the capital of the plaintiff was needed, though temporarily, to make good
the advances which were constantly made before the 60 days’ credits to
customers of the mines had expired and the money came in. Every
successful business would have its capital not only unimpaired but unem
ployed if its outstanding accounts receivable could be at all times liquidated
forthwith, but the chief use of capital is to carry it along until the pay
ments come in.
1 am of the opinion that the plaintiff had more than a nominal capital
and had a substantial invested capital which was employed in making
advances to or on account of the mines and also in buying merchandise
on its own account for profitable sale.
A verdict is accordingly directed for the defendant.
(T. D. 3338—May 29, 1922)
Estate tax—Act of September 8, 1916—Decision of Supreme Court.
1. Retroactive Operation of Statute—Trust Intended to Take Effect
at or After Death.
Act of September 8, 1916, Title II, is prospective and not retroactive
in operation, and section 202 (b) thereof is therefore not applicable to a
trust created prior to the passage of the act, but intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the creator of the
trust who died subsequently to the passage of such act.
2. Actions to Recover Tax Paid—Successor to Collector as Party
Defendant.
Suit may not be brought against a collector of internal revenue for
the recovery of a tax, in the collection and disbursement of which such
officer had no agency; therefore, the substitution of the successor to a
collector who collected a tax as defendant on the resignation of such col
lector was error, and a defense of nonliability set up by such successor
is sufficient. (Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., T. D. 3304, followed.)
The appended decision of the supreme court of the United States,
dated May 1, 1922, in the case of Union Trust Co. et al., executors, v.
Wardell, collector, reversing the judgment of the district court of the
United States for the northern district of California (T. D. 3151), is
published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 236. October Term, 1921.
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco and Albert Lachman, as executors of
the last will and testament of Henriette S. Lachman, deceased, plaintiffs
in error, v. Justus S. Wardell, United States collector of internal
revenue for the first district of California, and John L. Flynn, United
States collector of internal revenue for the first district of California.
Error to the district court of the United States for the northern district
of California.
[May 1, 1922.]
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:
This case was argued at the same time and submitted with No. 200,
Schwab v. Doyle, just decided. It involves, as that case did, the estate
tax act of September 8, 1916, and its different facts illustrate and aid
the principle upon which that case was decided.
Plaintiffs in error are executors of the last will and testament of
Henriette S. Lachman, deceased. They were also parties to a trust
deed made by her during her lifetime. They sued defendant in error
Wardell, he then being United States collector of internal revenue for
the first district of California, to recover the sum of $4,545.50 that
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being the amount of a tax assessed against the estate of Henriette S.
Lachman, upon the value of 4,985 shares of stock transferred in trust
by Henriette S. Lachman to trustees upon the assumption that the act
of Congress of September 8, 1916, was applicable to the trust
The following is a summary of the facts stated narratively: On
May 31, 1901, Henriette S. Lachman was the owner of 7,475 shares of
the capital stock of the S. & H. Lachman Estate, a corporation. On
that date she executed and delivered to Albert Lachman and Henry
Lachman, her sons, the following instrument:
Alameda, Cal., May 31, 1901.
To Albert Lachman and Henry Lachman, my sons:
This is to certify that I have delivered to you seven thousand four
hundred and seventy-five (7,475) shares of the capital stock of the
S. & H. Lachman Estate, represented by certificates numbers eleven
(11), twelve (12), and thirteen (13) respectively, however, upon the
following trust:
To pay to me during my lifetime, all the income earned and
derived therefrom, and, upon my death to deliver two thousand four
hundred and ninety (2,490) shares, respectively by certificates number
eleven (11) unto Henry Lachman, thenceforth for his absolute prop
erty; two thousand four hundred and ninety-five (2,495) shares, repre
sented by certificates number thirteen (13) unto Albert Lachman,
thenceforth for his absolute property; and yourselves, to wit, Albert
Lachman and Henry Lachman, to hold two thousand four hundred
and ninety (2,490) shares, represented by certificate number twelve (12)
upon my death, in trust paying the income derived therefrom unto
my daughter, Rebecca, wife of Lea Metzger, and upon the death of
my said daughter, the income and earnings derived from said two
thousand four hundred and ninety (2,490) shares shall be held, or
expended, by you, according to your judgment, for the benefit of my
grandchildren, the children of my said daughter, Rebecca Metzger, and
upon the youngest of said children attaining the age of majority, all
the then surviving children of my said daughter, Rebecca Metzger,
shall be immediately entitled to said two thousand four hundred and
ninety (2,490) shares in equal proportions.
Henriette Lachman.
The requirements of the deed were performed upon the contingen
cies occurring for which it provided.
On November 14, 1916, Henriette S. Lachman died, being then a
resident of Alameda county, Calif., leaving an estate of the value of
$302,963.64, which included 2,490 shares of the stock that passed to
her upon the death of her husband and 25 shares of stock in a business
that had been conducted by her husband but did not include the
transfer of the 4,985 shares included in the trust deed.
The will was duly probated and the tax under the act of September
8, 1916, was paid on the property which passed under her will, but no
tax was paid on the 4,985 shares transferred 15 years before by the
trust deed.
The commissioner having ruled that those shares were subject to
a tax, assessed against them the sum of $4,545.50. It was paid under
protest and this action was brought for its recovery.
Wardell demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them. The
demurrer was sustained and judgment entered dismissing the complaint.
Stating the contention of the plaintiffs, the court said it was that
“the act should not be construed as to include transfers made prior to
its passage, and that if it be so construed the act is unconstitutional.”
The court observed that “both of these questions were determined
adversely to the plaintiffs by the circuit court of Appeals for the eighth
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circuit in Schwab, executor, v. Doyle, not yet reported.” And said further,
“in that case the transfer was made in contemplation of death, whereas
in the present case the transfer was intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death, but manifestly the same rule of con
struction will apply to both provisions, and the same rule of constitu
tional validity.”
The court, while apparently relying on Schwab v. Doyle, declared that
it entertained “no doubt that the act was intended to operate retro
spectively, and a contrary construction could only be justified on the
principle that such a construction would render the act unconstitu
tional.”
The same contentions are made against and for the ruling of the
court as were made in Schwab v. Doyle. It is not necessary to repeat
them. They are, with but verbal variations, the same as in Schwab v.
Doyle, and the commissioner so considering, submits this case upon
his brief in that.
We have there stated them and passed judgment upon that which
we think determines the case; that is, the retroactivity of the act of
September 8, 1916. The facts in this case fortify the reasoning in
that. In this case the act is given operation against an instrument
executed 15 years before the passage of the act.
The record exhibits proceedings that should be noticed. The de
murrer of Wardell was sustained to the complaint, and a judgment
of dismissal entered January 13, 1921.
On February 2, 1921, plaintiffs gave notice of a motion to sub
stitute John S. Flynn as defendant in the place and stead of Wardell
in so far as the action was against Wardell in his official capacity,
and to permit it to be continued and prosecuted against him so far
as it was against him personally.
The grounds of the motion were stated to be that he had resigned
and Flynn had been appointed his successor and was then the acting
collector.
On February 7, 1921, the motion was granted. The order of the
court recited the resignation of Wardell and the succession of Flynn.
And it being uncertain as to whether this was a proper case for the
substitution of Flynn or was one which should proceed against Wardell,
and it appearing to the court on motion of plaintiffs that it was neces
sary for the survivor to obtain a settlement of the questions involved,
it was ordered that so far as the action was against Wardell in his
official capacity, it might be sustained against Flynn as his successor,
and that, so far as it was against Wardell personally, it should be
continued against him. And it was ordered that the action should
thereafter proceed against Flynn and Wardell without further pleadings
or process.
On February 9, 1921, Flynn filed an appearance by attorneys which
recited that he had been substituted in the place of Wardell in so far
as the action was against Wardell in his official capacity, and thereby
appeared in the action as such defendant.
It will be observed that there was no resistance to the motion of
substitution of Flynn nor exception by him, and that he almost imme
diately appeared in the action in compliance with the order of the
court. The subsequent proceedings were directed as much against him
as against Wardell, the bond upon the writ of error running to both.
However, this court decided in Smietanka, collector, v. Indiana Steel Co.,
October 24, of this term that a suit may not be brought against a
collector of internal revenue for the recovery of a tax, in the collection
and disbursement of which such officer had no agency. We think the
bringing of Flynn into the case was error. Therefore, upon the return
of the case to the district court, he shall be permitted to set up the
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defense of nonliability, if he be so advised, and, if he set up the
defense, it shall be ruled as sufficient for the reasons we have given.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
(T. D. 3339—May 29, 1922)
Estate tax—Act of September 8, 1916—Decision of Supreme Court.
1. Statutes—Retroactivity—Intention.
Statutes will not be construed as retroactive unless that intention is
clearly declared and the language makes such operation imperative.
2. Same—Transfers in Contemplation of Death.
Act of September 8, 1916, Title II, is prospective and not retroactive
in operation and section 202 (b) thereof is therefore not applicable to
transfers made or trusts created in contemplation of death prior to the
passage of the act, though the maker of the transfer or the creator of the
trust died subsequently thereto.
3. Same—Effect of Section 402, Revenue Act of 1918.
The provision of section 402 of the revenue act of 1918, which reënacted
section 202 of the act of September 8, 1916, that the transfer or trust
should be taxed whether “made or created before or after the passage of
the act,” was not an elucidation of the act of September 8, 1916, but was
the declaration of a new purpose, not the explanation of an old one.
The appended decision of the supreme court of the United States, dated
May 1, 1922, in the case of Victor E. Shwab, executor, v. Doyle, collector,
reversing the decision of the United States circuit court of appeals, sixth
circuit (T. D. 3119), is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 200. October Term, 1921.
Victor E. Schwab, executor of the last will and testament of Augusta J.
Dickel, deceased, plaintiff in error, v. Emanuel J. Doyle, United States
collector of internal revenue for the fourth collection district of Michigan.
Error to the United States circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit.
[May 1, 1922.]
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:
Augusta Dickel by a deed dated April 21, 1915, assigned and delivered
to the Detroit Trust Co., stocks, bonds, or securities of the declared value
of $1,000,000—with all their unmatured coupons, and the proceeds to be
derived therefrom, both principal and income, in trust, to invest and
reinvest and to pay the net income for life to Victor E. Schwab, or on
his written order. After his death the net income was directed to be paid
to six beneficiaries, his children. A power of delegating and selling or
exchanging all securities was given to Shwab, and of reinvestment. During
the life of Shwab the net income was to be paid to him or his order.
After his death the trust was to continue during the lives of the bene
ficiaries and the net income was to be paid to them during their respective
lives in equal shares.
There were other rights and powers given to plaintiff and the bene
ficiaries not necessary to mention.
The trust deed was accepted by the Detroit Trust Co. on or before
June 3, 1915.
Augusta Dickel died September 16, 1916, possessed of an estate of
$800,000. Seven days before her death Congress passed an act entitled
“estate tax act” (39 Stat. 777-780). The act provided that according to
certain percentages of the value of the net estate, a tax was to be imposed
upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage
of the act, “to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created
a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a
fair consideration in money or money’s worth. Any transfer of a material
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part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution
thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death, without
such a consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to
have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this
title. . . .”
Under the assumption that the act was applicable to the deed made by
Augusta Dickel to the Detroit Trust Co. a tax was assessed and exacted
from plaintiff in error (here called plaintiff) in the sum of $56,548.41.
Plaintiff paid it under protest and then to recover it brought this action
in the district court of the United States for the western district of
Michigan, southern division.
A jury being impaneled to try the case, the plaintiff presented his con
tentions in requests for charges. These were: (1) To find for plaintiff.
(2) Upon refusal of the court to so charge but not otherwise, that the
deed of Mrs. Dickel to the Detroit Trust Co. took effect more than a year
before the enactment of the act of September 8, 1916; that is, took effect
immediately, not in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of Mrs.
Dickel. (3) The words “in contemplation of death” do not refer to that
general expectation of death which every mortal entertains, but rather the
apprehension which arises from some existing condition of body or some
impending peril. (4) If Mrs. Dickel when she made the trust deed was
not in that apprehension arising from that condition of body or of an
impending peril, it was not made within the meaning of the act of congress.
(5) Mrs. Dickel having made the deed before the act of congress was
passed, her purpose was not to defeat or evade the federal revenue law.
There were other requests for instruction to the jury not material to
be considered except that the act of congress was not retrospective in
character and, therefore, did not impose a tax on the deed from Mrs.
Dickel to the trust company. And that if it could be considered to have
that character and effect, it would be unconstitutional and void as a denial
of due process of law, and the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation, contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
The court ruled against all of the requests so far as the court consid
ered them as presenting questions of law, but considered that whether the
trust deed was made in contemplation of death was a question for the
jury and submitted it to them, with aiding and defining explanations, and
concluded by declaring, “the whole question is the question whether the
transfer was made in contemplation of death; that is all there is to it.”
The verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant, upon which
judgment was duly entered. It was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
(269 Fed. 321), to the action of which this writ of error is directed.
Plaintiff urges against the judgment of the circuit court of appeals
all of the contentions presented in his requests made to the district court
for instructions to the jury, but so diverse and extensive consideration is
only necessary if the act of congress be of retrospective operation. To
that proposition we shall, therefore, address our attention.
The initial admonition is that laws are not to be considered as applying
to cases which arose before their passage unless that intention be clearly
declared. (1 Kent. 455; Bidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578; White v.
United States, 191 U. S. 545; Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151; Story, Const.
sec. 1398.) The comment of Story is, “retrospective laws are, indeed,
generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound
legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact.”
There is absolute prohibition against them when their purpose is
punitive; they then being denominated ex post facto laws. It is the sense
of the situation that that which impels prohibition in such case exacts
clearness of declaration when burdens are imposed upon completed and
remote transactions, or consequences given to them of which there could
have been no foresight or contemplation when they were designed and
consummated.
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The act of September 8, 1916, is within the condemnation.
There is certainly in it no declaration of retroactivity, “clear, strong,
and imperative,” which is the condition expressed in United States v.
Heth (3 Cranch, 398, 415) ; also United States v. Burr (159 U. S. 78, 82-83).
If the absence of such determining declaration leaves to the statute a
double sense, it is the command of the cases, that that which rejects
retroactive operation must be selected.
The circumstances of this case impel to such selection. If retroactivity
be accepted, what shall mark its limit? The circuit court of appeals found
the interrogation not troublesome. It said, “Congress would, we think,
scarcely be impressed with a practical likelihood that a transfer made
many years before a grantor’s death (say 25 years, to use plaintiff’s sug
gestion) would be judicially found to be made in contemplation of death
under the legal definition applicable thereto, and without the aid of the
two years’ prima facie provision.” In other words, the sense of courts
and juries, good or otherwise, might, against the words of the statute, and
against what might be the evidence in the case, unhelped by the presump
tion declared, fix the years of its retrospect. This would seem to make
the difficulty or ease of proof a substitute for the condition which the
statute makes necessary to the imposition of the tax; that is, the disposition
with which the transfer is made; and certainly whether that disposition
exist at an instant before death or years before death, it is a condition of
the tax.
The construction of the government is more tenable though more
unrestrained. It accepted in bold consistency, at the oral argument,
the challenge of 25 years, and a ruling of the commissioner of internal
revenue, in bolder confidence, extends the statute to “transfers of any
kind made in contemplation of death at any time whatsoever (italics ours)
prior to September 8, 1916.” The sole test in the opinion of that officer
is “the date of the death of the decedent.” He fixes no period to the
retrospect he declares, but reserves, if he be taken at his word, the
transfers of all times to the demands of revenue. In this there is much
to allure an administrative officer. Indeed, its simplicity attracts
anyone. It removes puzzle from construction and perplexity and
pertinence on account of the distance of death from the transfer, risk
ing no chances of courts or juries, in repugnance or revolt, taking
liberties with the act to relieve from its exactions to the demands of
revenue.
If congress, however, had the purpose assigned by the commis
sioner it should have declared it; when it had that purpose it did
declare it. In the revenue act of 1918 it rënacted section 202 of the
act of September 8, 1916, and provided that the transfer or trust should
be taxed whether “made or created before or after the passage of”
the act. And we can not accept the explanation that this was an
elucidation of the act of 1916, and not an addition to it, as averred
by defendant, but regard the act of 1918 rather as a declaration of a
new purpose; not the explanation of an old one. But granting the
contention of the defendant has plausibility, it is to be remembered
that we are dealing with a tax measure and whatever doubt exists
must be resolved against it.
This we have seen is the declaration of the cases and this the basis
of our decision; that is, has determined our judgment against the
retroactive operation of the statute. There are adverse considerations
and the government has urged them all. To enter into a detail of them
or of the cases cited to sustain them and of those cited to oppose them,
either directly or in tendency, and the examples of the states for and
against them, would extend this opinion to repellant length. We need
only say that we have given careful consideration to the opposing
argument and cases, and a careful study of the text of the act of
congress, and have resolved that it should be not construed to apply
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to transactions completed when the act became a law. And this, we
repeat, is in accord with principle and authority. It is the proclama
tion of both that a statute should not be given a retrospective operation
unless its words make that imperative, and this can not be said of
the words of the act of September 8, 1916.
Judgment reversed.
(T. D. 3348—June 10, 1922.)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Suit to Enjoin Collection of Tax—Remedy at Law.
Injunction will not issue to restrain a collector of internal revenue from
collecting an estate tax imposed by the revenue act of 1918, title IV, on
the ground that under section 408 of such act the executors of the estate
had until the expiration of one year and 180 days after decedent’s death in
which to pay the tax, and that such executors were without adequate remedy
at law. (Nichols v. Gaston, T. D. 3325, followed.)

Same—Appeal—Effect of Payment on Consideration of Case on Merits.
Where costs' have been decreed against a collector in the district court
in a suit enjoining collection of a tax from which he would be relieved if
the decree should be reversed, motion to affirm the decree or dismiss the
appeal on the ground that, in view of the payment of the tax before hearing
in the circuit court of appeals, the questions presented by the appeal were
academic, will be denied, and the case will be considered on its merits.
The appended decision of the United States' circuit court of appeals for
the first circuit in the case of Frank A. Page v. Frank L. Polk et al.,
reversing the decree of the district court of the United States for the
district of Rhode Island, is published for the information of revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. No. 1544.
October Term, 1921.
Frank A. Page, individually and as collector of internal revenue, defendant,
appellant, v. Frank L. Polk et al., executors, plaintiff, appellees.
Appeal from the district court of the United States' for the district of
Rhode Island.
Before Bingham, Johnson, and Anderson, judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

[May 16, 1922.]
Bingham, Judge: This is an appeal from a final decree of the district
court for Rhode Island in a suit in equity brought by Frank L. Polk and
the United States Trust Co. of New York, executors of the estate of
Josephine Brooks, against Frank A. Page individually and as collector of
internal revenue for the district of Rhode Island, restraining the latter
from collecting a tax assessed against the estate.
The complainants are citizens of New York and the defendant is a citizen
of Rhode Island. Josephine Brooks died August 17, 1920. The complainants
duly filed their return setting forth the value of the estate, and the com
missioner of internal revenue assessed thereon a tax of $245,787.67, under
title IV of the revenue act of February 24, 1919 (Stat. L, p. 1096). The
jurisdiction of the district court, as a federal court, is involved on the
ground of diverse citizenship and that the amount involved exceeds $5,000,
exclusive of interest and costs; also on the ground that the suit is one
arising under the internal revenue laws of the United States'.
There is no controversy as to the legality or amount of the tax assessed
against the estate. The complainants contend that under section 408 of
the act of 1919 they are given a year and 180 days after their testatrix’s
death in which to pay the tax, even though the commissioner of internal
revenue had not extended the time of payment under section 406 for

129

The Journal of Accountancy
180 days after its due date, and that the defendant was not authorized to
enforce its collection by distraint or otherwise until after the expiration
of 180 days; that in violation of this right the defendant, pretending to
act in his capacity as collector, on the 28th day of September, 1921, and
before the 180 days had expired, notified the complainants that, unless the
tax was paid within 10 days', he should proceed to collect the same, with
costs, by seizure and sale of property; that under section 408 of the act
of 1919 the collector is prevented from collecting the tax by distraint or
otherwise within 180 days; and that the threatened seizure, if carried out,
would have been unauthorized and an act not done by him in his official
capacity or with color of law. They further contend and allege in their
bill that if, to avoid such threatened distraint, they at this time paid the
tax they would be remediless in law, as they had the privilege, under section
406, of paying the tax at any time down to February 13, 1922, without
interest. It was also alleged in the bill that the payment of the tax at the
time of the commencement of the suit rather than on February 13, 1922,
would subject the estate to loss of interest on the money during the interim
in excess of $5,000 and would subject the estate to the difficulty of con
verting the assets' into cash for immediate payment of a large sum of money.
But it appears in the final decree that it was stipulated in open court that
the complainants had, at the time of the commencement of the suit and
at the time of entering the decree, assets in their hands sufficient to meet
the tax, and that the loss which they would have sustained by the payment
would have been the interest on the tax, unless they were able to recover
it back from the United States.
It was decreed that the payment of the tax was “not required by law or
compellable by distraint until one year and 180 days after the death of
Josephine Brooks, which occurred on the 17th day of August, 1920;” that
payment of the tax “at the time of the filing of the original bill herein,
instead of in February, 1922 * * *, would have subjected the estate
* * * to loss of interest on the money so paid during the interim,
amounting to a sum in excess of $5,000; and that if, to avoid the threatened
distraint, the plaintiffs should themselves pay such tax prior to February
13, 1922, they would be remediless in the law.” It was further decreed
that the defendant, his agents and servants, be permanently restrained
“from making or attempting to make any seizure, distress or distraint of
the property of the complainants * * * until the expiration of the 13th
day of February, 1922 (but no longer),” and “that the complainants recover
of the defendant, Frank A. Page individually, the sum of $46.54, their costs
and disbursements herein duly taxed.”
The bill of complaint was filed October 4, 1921. The final decree was
entered December 27, 1921. A petition for appeal and assignment of errors
was filed January 27, 1922, and on that day the appeal was allowed and
citation issued returnable to this court February 24, 1922, the service of
which was accepted January 27, 1922. The record was filed in this court
February 9, 1922.
On February 10, 1922, the 180 days having nearly elapsed, the complain
ants paid the collector of internal revenue the tax in question.
When the case came on for hearing in this court the appellees (com
plainants) moved to affirm the decree or dismiss the appeal on the ground
that, the tax having been paid, the questions presented by the appeal were
academic. The appellant objected and now contends that the case should
be considered on its merits and the decree reversed on the authority of our
decision of March 21, 1922, in Nichols v. Gaston et al., executors; that no
other course can properly be taken as costs' were awarded against him in
the court below, which he has paid.
Costs having been decreed against the appellant from which he would
be relieved if the decree should be reversed, we think the case must be
considered on its merits.—Matter of application of Martin v. W. J. Johnson
Co. (128 N. Y. 605).
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The facts in this' case, so far as they relate to the right of the appellees
to restrain the appellant from collecting the tax, differ in no respect from
those considered by us in Nichols v. Gaston et al., executors, supra, in which
it was held that the injunction was improperly issued. We see no occasion
for receding from the views' there expressed and are of the opinion that
the appellees’ motion should be denied, the decree of the district court
reversed, and costs awarded the appellant in this court and in the court
below.
The decree of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to
that court with directions to enter a decree dismissing the bill, with costs
to the appellant in this court and in the district court.
CONCURRING OPINION.

Anderson, judge. Sitting as district court on January 9, 1922, the
case of Gaston v. Nichols came before me. It then appeared that the issue
in that case was not distinguishable from the issue in the present case, in
which, on November 17, 1921, Judge Brown had filed a careful opinion.
It seemed plain that the question was one of substantial public importance
that ought to be determined speedily by the court of appeals.
Manifestly, it would have been of no practical use for me, sitting as
district court, to have studied the problem and formed and expressed an
opinion agreeing or disagreeing with Judge Brown’s views. Accordingly,
in order to speed the cause, without hearing the question argued, I ruled,
pro forma, as Judge Brown had ruled—the parties agreeing to cooperate
in every practical way in obtaining an early hearing in this court.
On this appeal in Page v. Polk I have for the first time considered the
question and examined the authorities. My views' accord with the decision
of this court in Nichols v. Gaston and in the instant case.

Accountants’ Meeting in Seattle
A meeting of members' of the Oregon and Washington Societies of
Certified Public Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accountants
of British Columbia was held at the Rainier Club, Seattle, on June 16th,
by invitation of the Washington society.
The meeting was devoted principally to social affairs, and there were
few formal discussions. The programme consisted of music, entertain
ment, an address of welcome by Harry W. Carroll, an address by A. L. C.
Chalk on conditions in Canada; Arthur Berridge of Portland spoke on
the subject of cooperation, and W. E. Cox of the accounting department
of the school of business' administration of the University of Washington
delivered an address on accounting as a profession. Dinner was held at
the Arctic Club.
Certified Public Accountants of Massachusetts, Inc.
At the annual meeting of the Certified Public Accountants of Massa
chusetts, Inc., held May 22nd, the following officers were elected: President,
Hollis E. Sawyer; vice-president, Stanley G. H. Fitch; secretary, Frederick
Bond Cherrington; treasurer, Robert Douglas; three members of the
executive committee: J. Edward Masters, Charles F. Rittenhouse and
George Lyall.
D. D. Gearhart announces the opening of an office at 1139 Granite
building, Rochester, New York.
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